Since social-economic systems increase interdependency, a crucial question arises: Is an interconnected world a safer or a more dangerous place in which to live? Over the last few years, we have witnessed the dark side of increasing interdependencies. As such, there is a growing need to focus on how to mitigate networked risk and to enhance the system resilience to the impact of a large-scale shock. The traditional engineering approach has been to design systems that are less vulnerable to damage from hazard events. On the other hand, system resilience is the ability to recover from failure and provide the continuity of system function.
Introduction
There is empirical evidence that as the connectivity of a network increases, there is an increase in performance, but at the same time, there is an increase in the chance of risk contagion which is extremely large. A risk to one subsystem may present an opportunity to another subsystem. This is especially apparent in wide areas such as engineering systems, financial systems and enterprise systems, where the actions of a subsystem in an interconnected network can impact all of the other subsystems in the network.
Therefore, increased network interdependency creates challenges with respect to how to cope with networked risks. The network is only as strong as its weakest link, and trade-offs are most often connected to a function that models system performance management. In this context, there is a class of problems, ranging from risk spreading to the control of cascade failure, that are naturally defined as risk management problems.
The risk of networked system is that something bad can happen in a system that is significantly larger and worse than the failure of any one node or subsystem. In banking systems, for instance, there is a tendency for crises to spread from one institution to another. This tendency leads to a systemic failure of a sufficiently large scale. A number of sources for systemic failure have been noted in the literature in order to explain the mechanism of bank failures during financial crises.
When studying uncontrollable large-scale threats to systems, scientific research has often focused on external shocks such as natural disasters. However, a number of major disasters that affect social-economic systems are related to the insides of the systems [15] . The networked system is subjected to external shocks with respect to both the size of the shock and the spatial impact of the shock. In traffic or electrical systems, a high load on some components cause failures, such as traffic jams or electrical line failures, with the potential to sever links or remove nodes from the network. On a longer time scale, a high load is an incentive for the installation of additional connections to alleviate the load.
If external shocks (or excess loads) at a particular node of a system is propagated to the other connected nodes due to failure, domino effects often come with disastrous consequences, known as cascading failures. Another mechanism behind cascade failure is explained as follows. There is a critical load at which risk sharply increases toward a threshold for cascade failure. Preventing these cascading failures due to external shocks and amplified internal shocks is an important emerging issue. The basic mechanism behind cascade failure is a feedback loop or a vicious circle that often induces undesired side effects. A large blackout may start with a fairly routine problem in a particular area. When this happens, things worsen all along the chain, until the system experiences a widespread failure.
Most natural and social systems are continuously subjected to both external noise and internal shocks, which can vary widely in amplitude. The amplification of risks lies in their systemic nature, and their impacts challenge the integrity of
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Enhancing the Resilience of Networked Agents through Risk Sharing 3 the system. Thus, it is not clear a priori if a given large event is due to a strong exogenous shock or amplified shocks by the internal dynamics of the system. In most cases, it may be due to a combination of both a strong exogenous shock and amplified shocks.
Cascading failures are propagative, i.e., a risk to one system may present an opportunity risk to another system. A variety of schemes for mitigating cascading failures exist, but the majority of these schemes depend on centralized control with full knowledge of network topologies. However, centralized designs are frequently more susceptible to situational awareness limitations and can be inadequate, resulting in increased vulnerability and disastrous consequences.
In this paper, we propose and analyze a mechanism of risk sharing that may enhance the resilience of the networked agent systems. We take the increased interdependency of social-economic systems explicitly into account. Especially, we design risk-sharing protocols in order to eliminate systemic risk or mitigate cascading failures. We consider two different types of risk sharing protocols. These protocols employ local risk (load) sharing rules to achieve global shock balancing. The models of shock transfer are built up in order to investigate stylized facts on how external shocks tend to be allocated in the agent network and how this allocation changes agents' failure probabilities. In particular, we focus on (i) how the risk allocation is affected by the risk sharing rules, (ii) how risk sharing changes agents' failure probabilities, and (iii) how the positive effects of risk sharing depend on the network topology and the distributions of the initial shocks. We show the proposed protocols may enhance the resilience of networked agent systems in coping with amplified risks.
Background Literature
Cascading failure is a result of load redistribution when a node initially fails. When all nodes are operational, the network operates steadily. However, the removal of a node will cause a redistribution of the shortest paths. This will generally increase the load of some of the nodes. If the load increase exceeds the capacity of any node, that node will fail, triggering a new redistribution and possible subsequent cascade failures. Eventually, the cascading failure will cease, when all remaining nodes can handle their loads. Motter and Lai [24] were the first to address the issue of cascading failure in distributed networks. Their model is generally applicable to realistic networks, such as the Internet or power grids, but is simple enough to support tractable analysis.
Network interdependencies are also apparent in financial networks, where the actions of a single actor in an interconnected network can impact all other actors in the network. Increased globalization and financial innovation have prompted a sudden increase in the creation of financial linkages and trade relationships between economic actors. A crucial question then arises. Is an interconnected world a safer or a more dangerous place in which to live? Over the last few decades, we have also witnessed the dark side of increasing interdependencies. The scope and speed of risk diffusion of recent financial crises have stimulated the analysis of the conditions under which financial contagion can actually arise.
Financial institutions may fail as a result of a common shock or a contagion process. A typical common shock leading to systemic failures is the collapse of residential real estate values. Contagion refers to the risk that the failure of one financial institution will lead to the default of other financial institution through a domino effect in the interbank market.
Allen and Gale [1] introduced the use of network theories to enrich our understanding of financial systems and investigated how the financial system responds to contagion when financial institutions are connected with different network topologies. They explored critical issues in the study of systemic risks by exploring fundamental questions, such as the degree of resilience of financial networks to contagion and the manner in which financial institutions form connections when exposed to the risk of contagion. They showed that increasing connections between banks might reduce the risk of contagion.
The emergence of financial instruments in the form of credit default swaps and similar products has improved the possibility for financial institutions to diversify risk. However, such instruments have also increased the overlaps in their portfolios. Allen et al. [2] proposed a model in which banks share the risk that the failure of one bank will propagate through contagion to the entire system. They analyzed the interaction between asset commonality and funding maturity in generating systemic risk through an informational channel.
Iori et al. [17] study systemic risk in interbank lending networks. Each bank faces fluctuations in liquid assets and stochastic investment opportunities. They show that an interbank market lets participants pool this risk but also creates the potential for one bank's crisis to propagate through the system.
In a series of papers, Battiston et al. [3] [4] explore the dynamics of default cascades in a financial network. Especially they investigate the probability of individual defaults and the probability of systemic default as a function of the network density. They show some tension emerges between individual risk and systemic risk from the fact that individual institutions are subject to a financial accelerator mechanism and may amplify the effect of an initial shock and lead to a systemic crisis.
Lenzu and Tedeschi [7] investigate an interbank market with heterogeneous financial institutions (agents). They study which network architecture can make the financial system more resilient to random liquidity shock and how systemic risk spreads over the network. They shows that a random financial network can be more resilient than a scale free one in case of agents' heterogeneity.
Gallegati et al. [13] examined the trade-off between the mutual insurance of financial institutions and systemic risk. Risk sharing in networks generally considers that links are formed voluntarily and focuses on the effect of individual choices on the configuration and stability of the network. In particular, efficiency is generally acknowledged to require complete connectivity and full insurance among all mem- bers of the network. In contrast, Gallegati et al. showed that risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall economic environment is favorable, whereas risk sharing might be detrimental when the overall economic environment is unfavorable.
Cainelli et al. [9] extended the work of Gallegati in order to analyze how production and financial networks can affect firms' default probabilities. They considered the equal shock transfer model in equilibrium and investigated various stylized facts on how agent-idiosyncratic shocks tend to be allocated in the network and how this allocation changes the agents' failure or default probability. They investigated how the capacity of an economic system to absorb shocks depends on the specific pattern of interconnections established among economic agents.
Cabraels et al. [8] investigated how the capacity of an economic system to absorb shocks depends on the specific pattern of interconnections established among economic agents. They focused on the optimal network topology that depends on the structure of the shocks. They found that the maximum extent of risk sharing is obtained when all agents form a single fully connected network.
Tedeschi et al. [29] investigate the relationship between business cycles and cascade of bankruptcies in an agent-based model. Their study sheds light on the correlation between the economic cycle and the trade-off between sharing risk and systemic risk.
Watts [31] and Lopez-Pintado [21] proposed general cascade models based on the micro-foundations of the agents in risky environments and clarified the conditions for diffusion and contagion in networks. There is also a large body of literature on the general problems of risk sharing outside of financial contexts, which has been motivated by its application to load sharing and shock absorbing. A number of studies have examined social diffusion and contagion.
Distributed load sharing over networks has a tradition in systems and control theory on agreement problems for distributed decision-making systems. Consensus problems also have a long history in computer science and control theory [18] . In network systems, consensus refers to reaching an agreement regarding a certain item of interest that depends on the state of all nodes. The consensus model has also been extensively applied to solve coordination problems of distributed systems. Methods for solving complex problems using distributed agents are increasingly prevalent in the literature. Hines and Talukdar [16] reported general strategies for developing distributed agents to control cascading failure of power networks.
Risk Transfer among Networked Agents
In the analysis that follows, we refer to a danger as the risk of being hit by a negative shock that is generated somewhere in the networked agents. There are two essential ways in which shocks can be diffused through a network. They can be transferred from one agent to its linked agents based on the specified rule or can be transmitted and spread to any other agents. The first process implies the preservation of the original quantity, whereas the latter implies its multiplication. Gallegati et al. [10] refers to the first as risk sharing, and to the latter as contagion.
As a shock propagates through a system, it may encounter components known as amplifiers that increase risks for other components in the system. Amplification occurs when such interaction forms a vicious cycle and thereby reinforces the effects of amplifiers. Amplifiers represent not only mechanisms that boost the scale of a shock to a particular system, but also a means to spread or intensify a hazard throughout several systems. This phenomenon is especially prevalent in concentrated and interdependent systems.
With respect to protection and risk reducing measures, there is evidence that we need to assess the risks of individuals and how their actions affect one another. Since these risks arise within interdependent networks, effective solutions usually require looking beyond an individual agent. The fact that the risk is often determined in part by the behavior of other agents imparts a complex structure to the incentives that individual agents face in reducing risk or investing in risk-mitigation measures.
The solution to an interdependent risk management problem may involve coordinating efforts to decrease risk collectively. Coordinating efforts and collective incentives can push the network to the tipping point or cascade, which then reinforces behavior that benefits the entire system. With the right incentives, the system itself can encourage actions by individual agents that reduce collective risk with full coordination. Coordination is the fundamental underpinning of agent systems, allowing agents to manage the associated risk with interacting agents before they can fail. We consider placing agents at each node in a network, each of which uses a coordinated risk transfer mechanism to share the risk or loads. Each agent considers not only its own risk or load, but also the statuses of nearby agents. Thus, the agents act with reciprocal altruism.
In this section, we consider the mechanism of risk transfer in which the shocks or excess loads of some agents are properly allocated in the network so that allocated shocks or extra loads are within the capacity of each agent. A dynamic description of risk sharing among distributed agents requires a preliminary definition of a network of agents, the topology of which is expressed as a graph. The analysis of risk sharing problems on networks relies heavily on matrix theory and spectral graph theory. Risk sharing in networked agents is formalized using a weighted network, where a direct linkage between two nodes reflects that the two nodes undertake a direct exchange of their risk (shocks). We allow for these risk swaps to occur repeatedly. Then, agents that may have only an indirect connection through intermediaries will end up having some reciprocal exposure to each other's risk if the exchange rounds are repeated.
Our goal is to derive the conditions for the channels between each pair of agents that guarantee that the risk sharing mechanism will eventually converge to the globally sustainable risks in a totally distributed manner without requiring the presence of the control agent. If the time needed to absorb the shock is large due to the asymptotic convergence, the risk sharing is unacceptable. Thus, it would also be important to reduce the time needed to achieve an appropriate risk sharing.
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In order to investigate network effects on risk sharing, we assume that each agent i of the N agents in the network will be hit by an external shock. We represent the transfer mechanisms of these idiosyncratic shocks by a weighted directed network through a matrix W = (w ij ), where the valued directed edge w ij from agent j to agent i measures the share of shock that agent j can transfer to agent i. We model the initial exogenous shock x(0) = {x i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N } of all agents as a random vector in which generic element x i (0) is an identical independent random variable with the same probability distribution. The shared shock of each agent i after one round is equal to
In general, the shared risks of all agents at round t is given by the dynamics
The long-run behavior of the transfer mechanism crucially depends on the network structure W . We analyze the limit distribution of the shocks in the network in the following two cases: (i) W is a row stochastic matrix and (ii) W is a column stochastic matrix. Reallocation of initial shocks with risk sharing can change agents' failure probabilities.
(Case 1) W is a row stochastic matrix:
If each row of W consists of the weights for which sum is unity, the power of W converges
where each row vector of W * is the left-eigenvalue
From (2) and (3), the risk of each agent i in equilibrium is equal, which is given as the weighted-average of the initial shocks weighted by each component of π
It is useful to observe the similarity with the consensus problems where all the nodes converge to the average of the nodes' initial values [27] . It follows that we obtain a solution to the averaging consensus problem if and only if π i = 1/N. Since π is a left eigenvector of W with eigenvalue equal to 1, this translates to the requirement that W in (2) must be a symmetric or a doubly stochastic matrix. (Case 2) W is a column stochastic matrix: If each column of W consists of the weights for which the sum is unity, the power of W converges
Each column of W * is the right-eigenvalue λ
From (2) and (7), the risk of each agent in equilibrium is different and is proportional to the sum of all shocks
Risk Sharing Protocols
The proposed approach does not consider agents' reactions to a change in the value of their risk, and they follow the risk sharing rule. As such, we consider the repeated round effects of the shocks, where agents are assumed to be more resilient to the shock in the sense of having a relatively high failure threshold. The shock migration strategy with risk sharing is to transfer the shocks among agents so that the shocks will be in balance. The goal of the risk sharing protocol is to mitigate the shock that hits specific agents. The surplus shock can be diffused through the network to reach a steady balanced state. In order to achieve this situation, a portion of the shock excess of the agents will be transferred to other agents. Since the risk transfer will not provide an immediately balanced solution, the risk transfer process is iterated until the shock difference between any two agents is smaller than a specified value. Risk transfer has some disadvantages resulting from the local nature of the risk information used. First, the shared shocks at equilibrium may not be balanced, and some agents may need to bear a larger proportion of the shocks. The second problem is that the number of iterations required may be high.
For this purpose, we consider two different protocols: a consensus-type sharing protocol (CSP) and a diffusion-type sharing protocol (DSP). In the case of CSP, each agent transfers an equal proportion of the shock, and the CSP acts to equalize the shock of all agents in equilibrium. In the case of DSP, each agent transfers the adjusted shock, which is proportional to its degree. The choice of the risk sharing protocol depends on the specific application of interest. In the next two sections, we investigate how risk sharing protocols mitigate systemic risk and cascading failure.
(1) Consensus-type sharing protocol (CSP) Consensus problems have a long history in computer science and form the foundation of the field of distributed computing [14] . In networked systems, consensus indicates reaching an agreement regarding a certain quantity of interest that depends on the initial values of each system (node). A consensus algorithm is an interaction rule that specifies the information exchange between nodes and all of its neighbors on the network. The theoretical framework for posing and solving consensus problems for networked systems is well surveyed by Olfati-Saber and Murray [27] . The formal study of consensus in groups of experts originates from statistics [11] [12] .
In CSP, each agent should know the current shock levels of the other connected agents. In general, it is not possible to reach the equilibrium in one step because agents are restricted to use local risk information, despite global risk information, and the transfer mechanism should be repeated. The shared risk of agent i at round t+1 is defined as the proportion to the sum of the differences to the other connected agents, as follows
x j (t) (9) where N i is the group of agents connected to agent i, and d i is the degree of agent i.
Essentially, the CSP operates as follows. Each agent i compares its current shock x i with the shocks of each of its neighbors in turn and transfers the difference to achieve a local shock balance. This process is repeated until all agents detect the shock to be locally balanced. In general, each agent is limited to shock information from within its own domain and cannot evaluate the entire shock within the system. From (9), the CSP has the risk preserving property
In the matrix form, we can describe the risk transfer dynamics with the CSP
where
, and A is the adjacency matrix A = (a ij ), which is symmetric with elements a ij = aji. The weight matrix W in (2) is given as
The sharing ratio w ij of agent i of the risk to agent j is
Therefore, each agent i shares a relatively large proportion 1 − αd i of its own risk and transfers a small, equal proportion of the risks of the other connected agents.
Since the weight matrix W in (12) is symmetric i.e., W = W T , W is a doubly stochastic matrix. Therefore, the risk distribution in equilibrium with the CSP is equalitarian, i.e., each agent in equilibrium receives a common shock amounting to the average of the initial shocks of all agents
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With the CSP, every agent tries to balance its shock with the shocks of the other connected agents. In such a situation, the strategy provides a shock balancing within the system, although the number of steps required depends on the initial distribution of the shock among the agents and on the interconnection network of the system. (2) Diffusion-type sharing protocol (DSP) The diffusion-type protocol (DSP) operates as follows. Each agent i transfers its normalized shock by its degree to the other connected agents. This process is repeated until all agents detect the shock to be locally balanced.
We describe the behavior of the DSP in a formal manner. The shared risk of each agent i at approximately t + 1 is defined as follows
The sharing rate w ij of agent i of the risk of agent j is
The DSP has also the risk preserving property
In matrix form, we have
The weight matrix W is defined as
The weight matrix W in (19) is not symmetric except for the case in which D = D T , in which the risk sharing with the DSP does not realize equal shock. By solving
we obtain
The shared risk of each agent in equilibrium is the weight proportional to the sum of all shocks, which is given as
Risk sharing protocols may have disadvantages resulting from the local nature of the risk information in the entire network. First, the network topology may not be known a priori, because each agent may only know or make bilateral relationships locally. The second problem is that the shared shock at equilibrium is not guaranteed to be well balanced, and some agents should share a larger proportion of the total risk, depending on which agent the shocks initially hit and the sizes of the initial shocks. In general, the shared risks in equilibrium depend on the statistical distribution of the initial shocks and on the interconnection network topology among the agents network of the system.
As an example, we consider a star network with N agents, and agent 1 is located at the center (hub agent). The degree of the center agent 1 is d 1 = N − 1, and the degree of the other agent is d i = 1, (2 ≤ i ≤ N ). Then, we have
(i) Risk sharing with the CSP All agents come to share the same shock level
If only the hub agent with the largest degree receives the initial shock, the CSP will force all other agents to share a larger shock. Risk amplifiers are often hubs or well-connected agents within a network that tend to pass risks to other agents. In a situation in which a hub agent is responsible for a large share of risky projects, for instance, an intense restriction on lending could substantially amplify the risk in the system. This agent could spread risk in a manner that is substantially out of proportion to its role in the system as a consequence of the possibility of system failure due to amplified propagation through the hub agent.
(ii) Diffusion-type Protocol (DSP) (Hub agent)
(Other agents)
Identifying the process by which amplification occurs as well as the conditions that can lead to the creation of amplifiers is extremely important for conducting risk assessment of potential global shocks. Without clear knowledge of what factors or entities could amplify a local crisis into global shock, a risk sharing process and subsequent resource allocation will underestimate the full potential of risk. As amplification occurs within a system, it can create tipping points that make for dramatic changes. It is important to understand where and when these tipping points might occur in order to prepare for of attempt to prevent these tipping points. Knowing where, when, and how amplification occurs should enable policy to substantially reduce uncertainty during a global shock situation. Once amplifiers are identified, policies can be tailored to act upon these components in order to maximize the impact of intervention on reducing and/or remedying the problem. This knowledge of where the risk of amplification lies on effective monitoring and surveillance systems. However, there are many complex situations to identify vulnerabilities associated with amplification.
The default analysis relies strongly on the risk sharing protocol to work out default probabilities at the limiting distribution of shocks. The advantage of both types of protocol is that risk sharing is irrelevant to the location of the initial shock and risk sharing basically operates depending on only the initial shocks.
The shared risk in equilibrium with the CSP does not depend on the agent network. Only the network topology affects the speed of convergence to equilibrium. In fact, slower convergence of the system to equilibrium is assumed to be undesirable. Hence, understanding the relationship between the structure of the agent network and the speed of convergence is crucial. This is a well-known problem that has been investigated extensively, and the convergence time is proportional to the second largest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix, L = D − A [32] . The convergence speed to the average-consensus on homogeneous networks, such as a random regular network, is much faster than heterogeneous on networks such as scale-free networks.
On the other hand, the shared risk in equilibrium with the DSP depends on the agent network. The network topology also affects the risk allocation in equilibrium. Agents of high degree come to share a large proportion of the risk and agents of low degree share a small proportion of the risk. Another implication for the DSP is that the important aspects of risk sharing from the viewpoint of risk mitigation include information on the statistical distribution and the sharing rule between neighboring agents, and the network topology is largely irrelevant. Therefore, risk management analysis is protocol based rather than topology based. In other words, network architectures may not be specified, and the initial shock should not be measured a priori.
Risk Sharing in Portfolio Management
A risk pool is a risk management strategy employed by insurance companies to ensure that losses from claims do not become catastrophic. The risk pool is seen as a way to provide protection to the individual while also protecting those who are providing the insurance. In the risk pool, everyone shares equal risk, making it unlikely that even a large-scale event would affect everyone in the same way. Therefore, the safest risk pool is one that has a large number of people involved. Just as in the law of large numbers in statistics, as more agents are added to the risk pool, the risk for the entity as a whole is reduced.
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In this section, we apply the risk sharing protocol by considering a simple model, in which each agent issues debt to finance a risky project. Projects are risky, and thus agents may default if the shock (the actual return, after subtracting the investment, cost) is greater than a certain minimum level. If risky projects are independently distributed, agents have an incentive to diversify to lower their individual default probability by exchanging shares of their own risky projects with other agents.
Gallegati et al. [13] considered the joint investment problem. Each agent i (financial institution) has a different investment portfolio subject to a stochastic return R i , which is drawn from a normal distribution with the average E(R i ) and the variance V ar(R i ). All agents can either operate in isolation and obtain an individual return E(R i ) or share the risk with all other agents. In the latter case, all agents pool their risk and receive the average of the stochastic returns, R = ∑ N i=1 R i /N . The default probability is obtained by comparing the limiting distribution of the stochastic average returns R and an individual expected return E(R i ) when each agent operates in isolation. They showed that the interbank linkages to share the risky project are beneficial only if the expected return E(R i ) is greater than a threshold to default.
Each agent can reduce its default risk through diversification of its own risky project. We model this by assuming that each agent can exchange shares of its risky project with other agents through bilateral relationships. We investigate two basic issues: (i) how the allocation of risky projects is affected by the risk sharing protocol and (ii) how the risk allocation changes agents' default probability. In order to obtain the gains of the risk sharing among the agents in terms of lowering the default probability, we need to take into account the distribution of the initial shocks to each agent and the final shock each agent obtains in equilibrium.
We assume that the initial shock of each i,
, is drawn from the identical distribution with the average E(X i ) and the variance V ar(X i ). We obtain the limit distribution of the shocks in the network with risk sharing and then investigate its impact on agents' failure probabilities. If the agents in equilibrium receive smaller shocks than their thresholds (resilience to default), these agents are safe from default or failure.
In order to assess the gains of risk sharing in terms of a lower default probability, we need to take into account the share of the overall shock the agent should sustain in equilibrium. In order to obtain the gain of the risk sharing, each agent should have a lower default probability. In particular, we investigate whether the share in equilibrium actually causes the expected value of the shock to exceed the agent's threshold.
We define the agent's threshold, which is proportional to the average shock, as θE(X i ), where θ > 0 is the tolerance parameter. In particular, if the share in equilibrium exceeds the agent's threshold, then that agent defaults. We compare the ratios of the safe agents when they operate under risk sharing with that for the case in which all agents operate in isolation.
We now consider the following situation. Each of N agents has access to an 
(ii) Risk sharing with the CSP From (14), each agent i shares the same shock in equilibrium, which is the average of the initial shocks of all agents
From the central limit theorem, the average Y of N stochastic variables X i with a uniform distribution converges to the normal distribution with mean
With the CSP, which is an equal risk sharing, if the risk in equilibrium is less than or equal to the agent's threshold, i.e., Y ≤ θE(X i ), all agents are safe, otherwise all agents default together. The probability that all agents are safe without default is
(3) Diffusion-type sharing protocol (DSP): Degree-based sharing protocol Let N agents manage to share their risky portfolio using the DSP. In this case, we assume that N agents form a heterogeneous network with the following power law degree distribution
From (22), all agents share the sum of the initial shocks in proportion to their degrees
Therefore, agents with a lower degree than the average degree d avg share lower shocks and are much safer than the agent with a higher degree. The ratio of the safe agents is
In order to get the gains of the risk sharing, each agent should have a lower default probability. In Fig. 1 , we depict the shock distributions in equilibrium under the risk sharing protocols.
In Fig. 2 , we depict the ratios of the safe agents as a function of the tolerance factor θ, when they operate in isolation and with risk sharing, the CSP, and the DSP. The CSP, which is an equal risk sharing reduces default rates if the tolerance the value of shock frequency using DSP for RND Fig. 1 . The shock distributions of agents operating under different risk sharing protocols and in isolation. We consider the two network topologies scale-free(SF) and random network(RND) for DSP. The initial shock distribution is uniform.
to the shock is high (θ > 1). On the other hand, if the tolerance is low (θ < 1), then risk sharing is dangerous. For instance, if financial institutions swap assets to diversify their individual risk, they hold common risky portfolios and may default together.
However, risk sharing with the DSP is safer in a wide region of the tolerance parameter. What matters is the correlation between the equilibrium risk shares, as determined by the network, and the agents' threshold. Some agents with high degrees obtain higher shares of the overall shocks, and most agents with lower degrees share low shocks in equilibrium. Therefore, the rate of safe agents becomes high, but can be lower without regarding the shock distributions in the network. However, risk sharing with DSP is dangerous either at low tolerance or at extremely high tolerance. If the agent tolerance is very low, any kind of risk sharing is dangerous and may increase the chance of simultaneous default. Even if agents' tolerance is very high, some agents of extremely high degree obtain higher shares of the overall shocks and may default.
For the case in which several agents operate in an isolated manner, some of these isolated agents may be in trouble if they end up receiving a shock larger than their threshold. On the other hand, some agents with high tolerance share higher risk they may survive together. However, the default probability depends on the ratio between the share of the overall shock in equilibrium and the agent's tolerance to the shock. If the agents that, in equilibrium, obtain higher shares of the overall shocks are agents with higher tolerance, then the rate of the safe agents can be relatively high by sharing the shocks of the other agents for the case of experiencing mild shocks simultaneously. In risk sharing with the DSP, on the other hand, a larger proportion of weaker agents in term of their tolerance to shock survive, but a very small proportion of the agents may default by sharing a larger proportion of the total shock.
The key issue we would like to investigate is how the gain from risk sharing depends on the capacity of each agent to absorb shock and on the interconnection patterns among agents with risk sharing rules. We also want to shed light on risky environments in which risk sharing would be beneficial to agents. The gain of risk sharing can be classified into three classes depending on the capacity to absorb shock: low capacity, high capacity, and extremely high capacity. We show that risk sharing is beneficial if agents' capacity to absorb shock is high. In the low-capacity and extremely-high-capacity classes, the agents cannot gain from risk sharing and isolation becomes more beneficial.
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We evaluate the gain from a collective point of view and classify risky situations in which risk sharing in networks is beneficial and works as a risk-pooling mechanism for to enhance agents' capacity to absorbing shock. Risk sharing does not reduce the agents' default rates unless the shock distribution they encounter is thin-tailed.
Watts [31] considered the problems of systematic risk and why no one could successfully determine exactly how the various dominoes would fall, leading to our current economic financial crisis. His argument is that the system has become too intertwined and complex, such that no one can really manage the risk. The reason systematic risk is such a problem is that it is so difficult to even imagine the scenarios taking place. Watts noted that the idea of trying to prevent "too big to fail" situations is a way of avoiding systematic risk. For companies that are too big to fail, failing is a symptom of a lack of transparency concerning the actual risk, and being too big to fail may not be problematic if agents agree to share the risk depending their size. This means increased openness and risk sharing, rather than the status quo of hiding the actual risk.
In the model of risk sharing in portfolio markets, for both the CSP and DSP protocols, the role of network topologies may be interesting in determining the speed of convergence to equilibrium, which can be considered as a proxy of the respective efficiency of the two protocols. Some preliminary study has been reported in [19] . Moreover, in the mitigating cascade failure with load sharing, it may be also interesting to consider simulations with other distributions of loads.
Mitigating Cascade Failure with Load Sharing
In this section, we investigate cascading failures due to overload. Cascading failures triggered by an initial failure of a single node due to overload sometimes occurred and generated significant damage, such as power blackouts, packet congestion on the Internet, and chain reaction bankruptcies. Since the degree of damage depends on the heterogeneously distributed load or capacity and the topological structure of the network, it is very important to study defense strategies.
Motter and Lai [24] were the first to address the issue of cascade failure in distributed networks. Their model is generally applicable to realistic networks such as the Internet and power grids, yet is simple enough to support tractable analysis, and their model consists of several key elements: (i) Traffic is simulated by the exchange of one unit of the relevant quantity (information, energy, etc.) between every pair of nodes along the shortest-hop path connecting each pair. The load placed on a node is then equivalent to the total number of shortest-hop paths passing through the node.
(ii) The capacity of a node is defined as the maximum load that the node can handle. The capacity C i of node i is assumed to be linearly proportional to its initial load Cascading failure is a result of load redistribution when some node initially fails. When all nodes are operational, the network operates steadily. However, the removal of a node will cause a redistribution of the shortest paths. This will generally increase the load at some of the nodes. If the load increase exceeds the capacity of any node, that node will fail, triggering a new redistribution and possible subsequent cascade failures. Eventually, the cascade failure will stop, when all remaining nodes can handle their load.
The damage caused by a cascading failure is quantified by G, the ratio of the number of survival nodes before and after the cascade. Using their model, Motter and Lai observe that G remains close to unity in the case of random breakdowns but is significantly reduced under attacks targeting the nodes of highest load. For example, even when every node has a capacity twice that of the initial load (α ≈ 1), the size of the largest component is reduced by more than 20%. For smaller values of (α ≈ 0), and when every node in the network is running under a high load, the damage is considerably greater when every node in the network is running under a lower load.
Motter [25] also works on an investigation of the possible strategies of defense in order to prevent the cascade from propagating through the entire network. He begins by noticing that a cascade can be divided into two events: (i) the initial attack, in which a small fraction of nodes is removed either by intention or random breakdown, and (ii) the propagation of the cascade, where another fraction of nodes is removed by subsequent overload failures. The method of defense rests in the strategic removal of nodes after (i) but before (ii). This is a valid assumption, because the time scale involved during a cascade failure is typically much shorter than the time scale at which the network grows. Intentionally removing nodes via a shut down procedure is feasible, but adding nodes or edges during a cascade event is not. Although the removal of nodes can result in an even smaller final connected component, it is possible to reduce the magnitude of the cascade by carefully choosing which nodes to remove. However, the proposed defense strategy is not so effective, especially when the tolerant capacity of the load is limited and the network is operating under a high load.
In this experiment, we present a new definition of risk (load) sharing by adding redistribution of overload. The traffic is simulated by sending one unit of flow from node i to node j with the shortest path connecting nodes i and j. The cascade simulation is a step-wise process, starting with the network N = N (0) at time 0, with no nodes overloaded. The initial failure is performed at time 1, by removing a single node of the highest load (the node with the highest node betweenness) from N (0) to form the network N (1). The redistribution of load is calculated and all loads L k (1) are updated. Nodes in which loads exceed their capacities are overloaded, and their loads are simultaneously redistributed with risk (load) sharing rules. After load redistribution, any node in which the load exceeds its capacity is removed to form the resulting network N (2). The redistribution of the load and the formation of a new network proceeds in this manner, until the cascade stops at time t by satisfying The effectiveness of load sharing is evaluated on a scale-free network, which follows a power-law distribution in node degree P (k) ∝ k −γ , where γ is the scaling exponent and the US power grid networks. Simulation results for the ratio of the survival nodes G in term of the tolerance factor α in Fig. 3 . Neither the scalefree network nor the US power grid network experiences a cascading failure for α as small as 0. Based on these results, we can conclude that risk (load) sharing is more effective with respect to cascading failure due to overload at some initial node compared with the defense strategy proposed by Luque et al. in [23] .
Conclusion and Extended Works
The networked system is subjected to an external shock, which can be amplified by internal shocks within the network. The goal of the present study was to develop a coordinated risk management system with risk sharing. Our focus was on how to prevent systemic risks or cascading failures due to amplified shocks. External shocks (excess loads) to some agents are propagated to other agents, and the amplification in the network often involves disastrous consequences. A promising method of mitigating a series of failures is to design the protocol of risk sharing. In particular, we focused on (i) how the allocation of risk is affected by the risk sharing protocol and (ii) how this reallocation changes agents' failure probabilities. We showed that the effectiveness of risk sharing depends on the agents' resilience to shocks as well as the distributions of the initial shocks.
We showed that the CSP works as an equalized sharing under any network topology and shock distribution. However, the CSP does not necessarily reduce the default rate, unless their resilience to the risk is high. The diffusion-type consensus, on the other hand, has an advantage over the isolated operation. However, neither the CSP nor the DSP risk sharing is effective. If the agent tolerance to failure is high, the results of simulations of cascading failures also indicate that the risk sharing approach can dramatically reduce the average size of large cascading failures. The model shows that the network acts as a perfect risk-pooling mechanism, when the network is both strongly connected and symmetric. However, the resort to risk sharing does not necessarily reduce default rates in the network, unless the shock they face is lower on average than their capacity.
Following a famous aphorism from former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Casti [10] classifies the different classes of uncertainty as Known Knowns (KK), Known Unknowns (KU), Unknown Knowns (UK), and Unknown Unknowns (UU). There are two broad categories of unknowns, namely, Unknown Unknowns, where we have essentially no data at all regarding the type of event we are trying to protect against, and Known Unknowns, where, although we do have data, it is a toss-up as to whether the data is relevant to the situation at hand. This line of thought leads to the consideration of how, exactly, we tackle the problem of pushing back the boundaries of uncertainty. Risk sharing could be also effective methodology to In future works we may analyze the evolution of dynamic networks deriving from the agents' reactions to changes in the value of the risk in the two sharing protocol and in isolation; aiming at evaluating the dynamic impact of the protocols on the resilience of networks. We are also interested in extending risk sharing protocols to a network of networks as considered in [7] and how risk sharing might be an effective approach to correlation breakdowns in financial portfolios as considered in [29] . Recently developed tools in network analysis provide the possibility of understanding the deep connective structure of a network of networks and to identify critical nodes in the modular or correlation structure that could lead to catastrophic systemic collapse. These tools may show us how to design effective risk sharing protocols that are resilient to various sorts of disruptions in different parts of a network of networks.
